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Trolling for Standards: How Courts
and the Administrative State Can
Help Deter Patent Holdup and
Promote Innovation
ABSTRACT
Antitrust law and patent law share the common goal of
improving economic welfare by facilitating competition and
innovation. But these legal fields conflict when baseless claims of
patent infringement disrupt the competitive process. In its eBay
decision, the Supreme Court muddied the precedential waters by
promulgating a vague doctrine of injunctive relief in patent
infringement cases. In the years since, a split has emerged in the
district courts on the question of which entities generally qualify for
injunctive relief as an additional remedy to damages. This uncertainty
has failed to mitigate an antitrust phenomenon known as "patent
holdup," whereby an original patentee is able to "hold up" a
downstream user of a particular patent by obtaining or threatening to
seek an injunction in order to extract a supracompetitive royalty
payment from the downstream licensee. The phenomenon implicates
antitrust law when such litigation tactics, often pursued by
patent-assertion entities (PAEs or "patent trolls'), produce deadweight
loss, chill follow-on innovation, and reduce competition. Courts have
generally not taken holdup considerations into account in applying the
vague eBay standard, and they lack the economic expertise to do so
properly. Guidance is needed from a specialized administrative agency
that is sensitive to the nuances of both patent and antitrust law. This
Note proposes that Congress give the Federal Trade Commission
authority to promulgate substantive rules to guide the district courts in
their application of permanent injunctions in patent disputes.
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Silicon Valley is a region at war.' Technology heavyweights
such as Apple, Samsung, Google, and Microsoft are currently engaged
in a race for mobile-computing supremacy reminiscent of the days of
mutually assured destruction.2 In July of 2011, the now-defunct
Nortel Networks agreed to sell more than six thousand patents to an
alliance made up of Apple, Microsoft, and other technology giants for
$4.5 billion in cash.3 Google was the losing bidder, falling $1.3 billion
short.4 Google's general counsel admitted that the bid was intended to
1. See Dominic Basulto, Patent Wars 2012: Here's What to Expect, WASH. POST (Jan. 4,
2012, 11:31 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/post/patent-wars-2012-heres
-what-to-expect/2010/12/20/gIQAruLpcPblog.html (describing the patent wars taking place in
Silicon Valley and the effect on the future of innovation).
2. See David Cardinal, The Patent War: Is it Killing Innovation?, EXTREMETECH (Oct.
31, 2011, 11:52 AM), http://www.extremetech.com/computing/101939-the-patent-war-is-it-killing-
innovation (comparing leading tech companies to Cold War superpowers pursuing a strategy of
mutually assured destruction (MAD)).
3. Chris V. Nicholson, Apple and Microsoft Beat Google for Nortel Patents, N.Y. TIMES
(July 1, 2011, 4:58 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/apple-and-microsoft-beat-google-
for-nortel-patents (describing the sale of the Nortel patents).
4. See Cardinal, supra note 2.
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discourage competitors from suing the company for patent
infringement as the company moved deeper into the mobile computing
business.5  Implicitly, Google was threatening to use the Nortel
portfolio to countersue any adversaries (not to be outdone, Google
eventually acquired Motorola Mobility and its patents for $12.5
billion).6  The technology giants are on notice: in the
twenty-first-century patent wars, annihilation will be met with
annihilation.7
The proliferation of patent infringement suits will likely prove
detrimental to US consumers and the economy as a whole.8 Of course,
the US patent system serves the important role of incentivizing
innovation by granting companies the exclusive right to commercialize
their innovative products.9 Patentees protect their inventions through
various patent-enforcement regimes, such as patent infringement
suits.10 The high-tech sector reflects this truth, as patent holders have
filed thousands of patent infringement suits in recent years." Indeed,
patent infringement lawsuits in the United States increased by 70
5. See Mark Hachman, Google Bids $900M for Nortel Wireless Patents, PCMAG.CoM
(Apr. 4, 2011, 1:09 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2383044,00.asp (quoting Google's
general counsel as saying their Nortel bid was a defensive measure). In a move related to the
theme of this Note, Google subsequently accused the Microsoft-led consortium of anticompetitive
practices in bidding up the price of the Nortel patents. See Mary Jo Foley, Google Calls
Microsoft-Apple Collaboration on Nortel Patents Anti-Competitive, ZDNET.COM (Aug. 3, 2011,
1:06 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/microsoft/google-calls-microsoft-apple-collaboration-on-
nortel-patents-anti-competitive/10271.
6. See Hachman, supra note 5; see also Robin Wauters, Google Buys Motorola Mobility
for $12.5B, Says 'Android Will Stay Open", TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 15, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/
2011/08/15/breaking-google-buys-motorola-for-12-5-billion (announcing the Google acquisition of
Motorola).
7. See Jon Brodkin, Can 17,000 Patents Help Android Win a Legal Cold War?, WIRED
(Dec. 22, 2011, 5:43 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/12/android-patent-war
(analogizing patent acquisitions in the patent tech war to stockpiling nuclear weapons during
the Cold War).
8. See James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion 28-29
(Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 05-18, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=831685 (arguing that patent litigation undermines companies'
incentives to innovate); see also Emi Kolawole, Is U.S. Innovation Experiencing Death by Patent?,
WASH. POST (July 27, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/post/is-
us-innovation-experiencing-death-by-patent/2011/07/26/gIQANnAubIblog.html (discussing how
the patent wars have distracted some of the country's most innovative companies in lengthy
litigation).
9. See generally MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 19-33
(2009).
10. Id.
11. Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence
in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1594-96 (2009) (noting that the
federal district courts handled 2,300 patent infringement suits between 2000-2008, mostly in the
technology sector).
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percent between 2004 and 2009.12 Some commentators argue that the
only "winners" from these legal battles are the lawyers who litigate
the disputes and the patent holders who may or may not be the
original inventors.13 The "losers" are US consumers, who ultimately
pay the pass-through costs of this litigation, and potential inventors,
who are either deterred by innovation bottlenecks or sued after
bringing a product to market.14 The ultimate casualty may be the US
economy, which becomes less competitive and innovative with every
lawsuit. 15
So, while the average patent infringement suit may serve
useful purposes, many scholars, antitrust regulators, and companies
view spurious patent infringement suits as anti-competitive,
especially when they are brought by patent assertion entities (PAEs)
engaging in "patent holdup."16 PAEs are often referred to as "patent
trolls," a term that describes patent owners who neither invent nor
make products, but instead accuse large companies of patent
infringement and use the threat of permanent injunctions to extract
exorbitant fees in licensing and settlement negotiations.17 PAEs
12. 411: When Patents Attack!, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (July 22, 2011) (transcript
available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/transcript).
13. Google's Schmidt Warns Europe to Avoid a System Prone to Patent Wars, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 5, 2011, 4:02 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20111205-712342.html ("When
you pick these big patent fights, the winners are the lawyers.").
14. See Stewart Mitchell, Microsoft and Apple Patents "Push Up Price of Android", PC
PRO (Aug. 4, 2011, 8:27 AM), http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/369100/microsoft-and-apple-patents-
push-up-price-of-android (reporting that Google's patent war with Apple and Microsoft could lead
to price increases for Google's Android phones).
15. See Kolawole, supra note 8.
16. See infra Part II.A (describing the antitrust concerns arising out of patent holdup).
This Note uses the term "patent assertion entity" to refer to firms whose business model focuses
on purchasing and asserting patents, rather than developing and/or manufacturing patented
products. PAE is used instead of the more familiar "non-practicing entity" (NPE) because NPEs
technically "encompass[] patent owners that primarily seek to develop and transfer technology,
such as universities[, small inventors] and semiconductor design houses" whereas PAEs do not
perform the valuable function of developing technology. FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE:
ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8 n.5 (2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/ 110307patentreport.pdf.
17. See CARRIER, supra note 9, at 233-34. The term patent trolls "comes from fairy tales
in which a troll hiding under a bridge leaps out to demand a toll before letting anyone cross.
Certain patentees, so the analogy goes, wait until products incorporating the patented
technology are marketed, at which point they surface to charge a toll of licensing fees." Id. at
234. The term's use has been subject to much debate. Some scholars and business commentators
support the pejorative use of the term, while others view PAEs in a positive light. Compare
Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810 (2007) (calling such entities patent "blackmailers"), with James
F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent
Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 201 (2006) (referring to PAEs as "patent
dealers" and extolling their virtues). Regardless of the appropriateness of the term "patent troll,"
there are many real-world examples of PAEs extracting settlement awards in excess of the value
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typically do not innovate because innovation requires additional
development beyond simply purchasing a patent.18 Some academics
believe this behavior is worthy of antitrust condemnation when it rises
to the level of "patent holdup."19 Patent holdup occurs when a
downstream manufacturer makes or sells a multicomponent end
product that incorporates patented technology and the manufacturer
is then "held up" when a PAE obtains an injunction or threatens an
injunction in order to extract a supracompetitive (i.e., above-market)
royalty payment from the downstream manufacturer.2 0 PAEs use the
threat of injunctions to extract royalty payments in excess of the
economic value of their inventions.21 The strategy has raised antitrust
concerns because it deters follow-on innovation and decreases
competition.22
The courts, thus far, have failed to address patent holdup
concerns effectively.23 District courts have granted equitable relief to
PAEs on an inconsistent basis, and the Supreme Court has only
muddied the waters.24  In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, a
unanimous Court held that the grant of permanent injunctive relief in
a patent case should be governed by "traditional principles of
equity."25 But the Court ultimately punted on the question of whether
the PAE that brought the suit against eBay was eligible for injunctive
of the asserted patent. See, e.g., Rob Kelley, BlackBerry Maker, NTP Ink $612 Million Settlement,
CNNMONEY (Mar. 3, 2006, 7:29 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/technology/rimm-ntp
(describing one of the many high-profile examples where a large company (here, Research in
Motion) was forced to pay millions in a settlement agreement o patent-holding company to avoid
the shutdown of its service); see also Tom Krazit, RIM Calls for Patent Reform in Newspaper Ad,
CNET News (Mar. 14, 2006, 2:37 PM), http://news.cnet.com/RIM-calls-for-patent-reform-in-
newspaper-ad/2100-1047_3-6049699.html (describing that RIM was still forced to settle its
patent dispute even though the USPTO rejected the validity of NTP's patents while the case was
on appeal because of the injunctive relief granted to NTP and fear that NTP would appeal the
USPTO's rejections for years on end). Another particularly egregious example of patent trolling
involved TechSearch and Intel, where the former purchased a patent for $50,000 in bankruptcy
proceedings and unsuccessfully sued the latter for $5 billion. See CARRIER, supra note 9, at
234-35.
18. See FTC, supra note 16, at 63.
19. See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34
J. CORP. L. 1151, 1153-54 (2009).
20. See id. at 1153-54; see also infra Part I.B. Of course, there may be additional
reasons to be concerned about patent trolls beyond the patent holdup concerns. See CARRIER,
supra note 9, at 234 (discussing how PAEs have led to a proliferation of patent infringement
suits because they are not as concerned with counterclaim liability exposure and because they
"usually do not confront customers exerting pressure to settle litigation or shareholders skeptical
of patent enforcement").
21. See FTC, supra note 16, at 5.
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. See infra Parts I.D, II.A.
24. See infra Part I.D.
25. 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
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relief, which gave the lower courts no guiding principles.26
Consequently, neither district courts nor parties involved in patent
disputes know whether and when an injunction is a proper remedy.27
This resulting uncertainty in the law has exacerbated the negative
effects of patent holdup.28
Congress and federal administrative agencies have also failed
to resolve the patent holdup issue,29 despite the Federal Trade
Commission's (FTC) conclusion that spurious threats of injunction
made by PAEs are hamstringing the high-tech industry.30 On March
7, 2011, the FTC released a report that made several specific
recommendations for reforming patent remedies (both damages and
injunctive relief),31 but these recommendations carry little weight as
long as the FTC lacks effective and substantive rulemaking
authority.32  Congress has the power to grant the FTC such
rulemaking authority but has failed to do so; so far, Congress has only
nibbled around the edges of the patent holdup debate.33  On
September 16, 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, which limits the ability of PAEs to join unrelated parties
to a suit.3 4 However, such actions ultimately do not go far enough.35
The government could, and should, do more to address patent
holdup.36
This Note explores an important and unresolved topic at the
crossroads of intellectual property (IP) and antitrust law: namely, how
the courts and the administrative state can prevent patent holdup.
Part I introduces patent holdup and provides an overview of the
26. See infra Part I.C.
27. Jeffrey D. Sullivan, U.S. Supreme Court eBay Case Could Alter Landscape for
Patent Injunctive Relief, http://www.bakerbotts.com/files/Publication/f61769b7-25b6-4448-ad3c-
bOlc66956a3f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1899fd77-ae2-4bdc-b929-b40847b2486e
LESANZ%20eBay%20Article.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2012).
28. See infra Part I.D.
29. See infra Part II.E.
30. See FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 29 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
31. See FTC, supra note 16, at 3.
32. See infra Part III.A.
33. See infra Part III.A.
34. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); Charles
Gorenstein, America Invents Act Exercises "Con-Troll" Over Patent Litigation, IP WATCHDOG
(Sept. 19, 2011, 3:50 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/09/19/con-troll-over-patent-
litigation/id=19279 (describing the Act's joinder restrictions, but noting that it is so far unclear
how the courts will interpret this provision).
35. See What Patent Reform Means for Retailers: 4 Key Provisions of the America
Invent[s] Act, PATENT LAW PRACTICE CENTER (Sept. 13, 2011, 2:28 PM), http://patentlawcenter.
pli.edu/2011/09/13/what-patent-reform-means-for-retailers-4-key-provisions-of-the-america-
invent-act/#more-4207.
36. See infra Part III.A.
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complex interplay between antitrust and patent law. It also discusses
how the eBay decision promulgated a vague doctrine of injunctive
relief in patent disputes, causing inconsistency in lower-court rulings.
Part II argues that the uncertainty that eBay introduced likely
increased the frequency of patent holdup. It also analyzes two cases to
illustrate why solutions involving private ordering are inadequate,
and suggests that there may be a need for governmental action in
addressing patent holdup. Finally, Part III proposes that Congress
grant the FTC substantive rulemaking authority so that the FTC can
guide courts in their determinations of appropriate equitable remedies
in patent disputes.
I. AT THE CROSSROADS OF ANTITRUST AND IP: AN OVERVIEW OF
PATENT INJUNCTIONS
Some believe that IP rights contradict antitrust law's goal of
free market competition, but this view is simplistic and inaccurate.7
Indeed, IP and antitrust law are broadly consistent in their aims.3 8
Patent holdup, however, highlights a new area of tension in the
antitrust-IP interface.39
A. The Antitrust-IP Interface
Antitrust law and IP law interact in complex ways.40 Since the
enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, judges have perceived greater
conflict between patents and antitrust policy than has actually
existed.41 US patent laws grant inventors a twenty-year right to
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or
importing a patentee's invention.42 Thus, patents give inventors
exclusive use of their ideas, which theoretically reduces the diffusion
37. See infra Part I.A.
38. See infra Part IA.
39. See Joshua D. Wright & Aubrey N. Stuempfle, Patent Holdup, Antitrust, and
Innovation: Harness or Noose?, 61 ALA. L. REV. 559, 561 (2010).
40. See, e.g., ROBERT D. ANDERSON & NANCY T. GALLINI, COMPETITION POLICY AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 20-21 (1998).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.
1981) ("There is an obvious tension between the patent laws and antitrust laws. One body of law
creates and protects monopoly power while the other seeks to proscribe it."). Even further back in
history, courts assumed that patents were themselves "monopolies." See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick
Co., 224 U.S. 1, 27 (1912) (describing a patent as a "true monopoly" with origins "in the ultimate
authority, the Constitution"). Commentators at one time agreed. See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, The
Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L.
REV. 633, 658 (1971) ("A patent is a legalized monopoly. As such, it is the principal legal
exception to our national policy of free economic competition.").
42. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1)-(2), 271(a) (2006).
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of those ideas to other potential competitors during the patent term.43
Viewed through the antitrust lens, protecting an inventor from
competition for a period of twenty years arguably gives that inventor
the ability to restrict output or raise prices.44 Indeed, many courts
have referred to patents as monopolies.45 Thus, because antitrust law
is concerned with preventing the acquisition or maintenance of
monopoly power, many courts and scholars viewed patents and
antitrust as inherently at odds.46
The historical view is oversimplified, however, and courts and
antitrust agencies have moved away from the presumption that
patents automatically create monopolies.47 In fact, patent rights do
not in and of themselves confer monopoly power over a particular
market.48 Although patentees possess an exclusive right to make, use,
and sell their patented invention, the patent right is only a negative
right to exclude; it is not a positive right to the commercial success of
the resulting product(s).49  In addition, patented products must
compete with substitute goods that patents may also protect.50 Thus,
there is nothing stopping consumers from substituting away from a
patented product to a different product if they feel the price for the
patented product is excessive.51 In a monopolistic market, by way of
contrast, consumers lack this choice.52
Antitrust law and patent protection actually strive toward a
common end.53 Each body of law shares the goal of maximizing
43. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 9 (2d ed. 2011).
44. Id. at 9-10.
45. See, e.g., Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947) ("[P]atents
confer a limited monopoly of the invention they reward."), overruled by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v.
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). One scholar observed that patents were viewed as limited
exceptions to anti-monopoly rules even in seventeenth-century England. Chisum, supra note 41,
at 635 n.12 ("After the English Statute of Monopolies in 1624, which banned royal grants of
monopolies but excepted letters patent to first inventors, infringement of a patent was
considered a tort at common law for which the patent owner could recover consequential
damages through an action for trespass on the case.").
46. See Westinghouse, 648 F.2d at 646.
47. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 37 (2007).
48. See Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 45 ("Congress, the antitrust enforcement agencies,
and most economists have all reached the conclusion that a patent does not necessarily confer
market power upon the patentee.").
49. In 1988, Congress amended the Patent Code to eliminate the presumption that a
patent confers market power. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2006); see Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 45.
50. See CARRIER, supra note 9, at 52-53.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (observing that antitrust and patent law "are actually complementary, as both are aimed
at encouraging innovation, industry and competition").
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"wealth by producing what consumers want at the lowest cost."54 The
separate legal regimes strive to maximize consumer welfare-antitrust
law by lowering barriers to entry and promoting competition, patent
law by incentivizing innovation.55  Antitrust's promotion of
competition serves consumers by ensuring the lowest costs for the best
products.56 Patent law's effect is more indirect.57 The "temporary
monopoly" afforded by a patent may increase prices and restrict
output of a particular product in the short term.5 But because
companies produce an invention only if it can be profitable, patent
exclusivity allows an inventor to recover research and development
costs, prevents free-riding, and thus creates incentives for
innovation.59 As a result, both antitrust law and patent law promote
"the efficient production of those things consumers value."60
This is not to say that antitrust and patent law never conflict.61
Although antitrust law and patent law have a common central
economic goal of maximizing consumer welfare, the effects of antitrust
policy and patent law are sometimes in tension.62 For example, in the
past, courts have been wary of tying arrangements, patent pools,
standard-setting organizations, and refusals to deal.63 In recent years,
academics and antitrust regulators have identified patent holdup as
an emerging area of tension.64
B. Patent Holdup
Many commentators and antitrust authorities consider patent
holdup anticompetitive and harmful to innovation, particularly when
it arises out of spurious patent infringement suits brought by PAEs. 6
Holdup arises in the context of a downstream manufacturer making,
using, or selling products that unknowingly incorporate a patented
technology.66 The manufacturer is "held up" when a PAE refuses to
license on "fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory" (FRAND) terms





58. See id. at 3.
59. See id. at 2.
60. See id. at 3.
61. See id. at 1-3.
62. See id.
63. See CARRIER, supra note 9, at 73-77.
64. See FTC, supra note 16, at 5; Cotter, supra note 19, at 1151-52.
65. See FTC, supra note 16, at 5, 8; Cotter, supra note 19, at 1160.
66. Cotter, supra note 19, at 1160.
2012] 169
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
and instead obtains or threatens to obtain an injunction in order to
extract a supracompetitive royalty payment from the downstream
manufacturer.67 PAEs use the threat of injunctions to extract royalty
payments in excess of the economic value of their inventions.68 This
phenomenon is most prevalent in multi-component technological
products where the accused infringer is unable to separate the
allegedly infringing component from the non-infringing ones after
production.69 Holdup can arise when one party makes sunk-cost
investments specific to a technology without realizing that the
technology may implicate another party's patents.70 In such cases, the
availability of injunctive relief provides PAEs with an opportunity to
seek royalties for its patents under the threat of litigation.71 When
threatened with business shutdown, manufacturers with sunk costs
will be forced to pay a royalty up to their "switching costs," which
would be in excess of the royalty the patentee would have received in
ex.ante (i.e., preinfringement) negotiations.72 The patentee thus finds
itself with excessive bargaining power, which allows it to capture
value beyond that of its invention.73
Patent holdup causes both static and dynamic efficiency
losses.74 By taking advantage of a manufacturer's dependence on a
patented component in its technology and threatening an injunction,
patentees engaging in holdup are able to earn more compensation
than they would have earned via a reasonable royalty in the
technology market.75  This is significant because the additional
compensation represents an income transfer from the alleged infringer
to the patentee, whether the alleged patent infringement is valid or
not.7 6 Holdup creates static effects by increasing costs to innovators,
discouraging invention (i.e., creating deadweight loss), and weakening
67. See FTC, supra note 16, at 5; Cotter, supra note 19, at 1160-61 n.200.
68. FTC, supra note 16, at 5; Cotter, supra note 19, at 1160-61.
69. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1991, 2009-10 (2007).
70. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 1179 ("[Tjhe elements of patent hold up ... are present
[when] the patent reads on a component of a multicomponent end product, the owner is a
nonmanufacturing patentee, and the prospect of obtaining injunctive relief ex post facilitates the
extraction of substantially higher royalties than would be attributable to the value of the
patented feature alone.").
71. See id. at 1161-62.
72. See FTC, supra note 16, at 5. "Switching costs" are "the costs that an infringer would
incur as a result of switching from its current design to the best alternative, including any costs
of redesign, investments in additional plant or equipment, any difference in incremental
production costs, and any difference in consumers' willingness to pay for the product." Id. at 190.
73. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 69, at 2009-10.
74. Cotter, supra note 19, at 1162.
75. FTC, supra note 16, at 5.
76. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 1162.
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competition in the market.77 It also causes dynamic effects78 by
promoting rent-seeking by PAEs and reducing the incentives to
innovate for manufacturers who produce complex, multi-component
systems.7 9  Indeed, the availability of injunctive relief to PAEs
incentivizes "lie-in-wait" behavior, where PAEs litigate ex post rather
than license ex ante.80 Manufacturers fear exposure to PAEs that may
ambush them once they are "locked in" to a particular technology.81
Uncertainty breeds risk aversion as companies become less willing to
risk infringement, and risk aversion diminishes innovation.8 2 Holdup
raises prices for consumers by depriving them of the benefit of
"competition among technologies."3  By deterring innovation and
follow-on competition in the marketplace, patent holdup threatens the
very purposes of patent and antitrust law.8 4
C. eBay's Ambiguous Injunctive Relief Standard
US patent law prescribes two main remedies for findings of
patent infringement: injunctions and damages.85 Section 283 of the
Patent Act of 1952 grants federal courts broad discretion to enjoin
patent infringement.86 The frequency with which courts have granted
injunctions in patent infringement cases has ebbed and flowed over
the years.87 Before 2006, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit automatically granted injunctive relief to prevailing patentees
77. See id. at 1155, 1167-68.
78. See id. at 1155.
79. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 69, at 2010.
80. FTC, supra note 16, at 227.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 5.
84. See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 19, at 1151-52; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 69, at
1995. But see John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111,
2148-49 (2007); J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive
Relieffor Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714, 747 (2008).
85. This Note is primarily concerned with permanent injunctions. For a discussion of
the unique issues involved in calculating damages in cases of patent infringement, see FTC,
supra note 16, at 137.
86. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1952) ("The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this
title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of
any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.") (current version at
35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006)). As one scholar noted, although patentees have been entitled to damages
through an action for trespass since at least 1624, the availability of injunctive relief was slow to
emerge. Chisum, supra note 41, at 635 n.12 ("The federal circuit courts were given equity
jurisdiction over infringement actions in 1819.").
87. See CARRIER, supra note 9, at 236-38.
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upon a finding of infringement.88 In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,
the Supreme Court eliminated the presumption that a court should
automatically grant an injunction,89 but failed to delineate when a
patentee qualifies for injunctive relief.90
The Supreme Court's decision in eBay ignited a debate
regarding the applicability of permanent injunctions in patent
disputes.9' In eBay, respondent MercExchange, LLC was a PAE that
"[hield a number of patents, including a business method patent for an
electronic market designed to facilitate the sale of goods between
private individuals by establishing a central authority to promote
trust among participants."92  Petitioner eBay, Inc. had willfully
infringed one of MercExchange, LLC's patents.93 In reversing the
Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court specifically rejected a rule
adopted by the Federal Circuit under which a prevailing plaintiff in a
patent infringement case was automatically entitled to permanent
injunctive relief absent exceptional circumstances.9 4  The Court
reasoned that nothing in the Patent Act indicated that Congress
intended a departure from the "long tradition of equity practice."95
Instead, the Court noted that the Patent Act expressly provides that
injunctions "may" issue "in accordance with the principles of equity."96
Thus, the Court held that the propriety of injunctive relief under § 283
was governed by the traditional multi-factor test for suits in equity.97
The Court listed four factors that a patentee must satisfy to
obtain an injunction: a patentee must show (1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
88. The Federal Circuit treated injunctions after a finding of patent infringement as
effectively mandatory, but the Supreme Court overruled that position. See MercExchange, L.L.C.
v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[Clourts will issue permanent injunctions
against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances."), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006);
see also Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Infringement
having been established, it is contrary to the laws of property, of which the patent law partakes,
to deny the patentee's right to exclude others from use of his property.").
89. eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
90. See Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161,
168 n.13 (2007) (criticizing eBay for referring to "a 'familiar' four-part test that the Court had
never before applied").
91. Id.
92. eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
93. Id. at 390-91.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 392.
97. Id. at 390.
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interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.98 Thus,
the Court rejected per se rules in applying injunctive relief.99
Chief Justice Roberts's and Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinions foreshadowed a debate that continues in the district courts
today.100 Chief Justice Roberts observed that courts historically
granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast
majority of patent cases and suggested that the district courts should
use this as a rule of thumb.101 Justice Kennedy's concurrence alluded
to patent holdup as a reason why the general rule may be
inappropriate in some cases.102 He observed that PAEs represent a
new breed of patentees who "use patents not as a basis for producing
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing
fees,"103 and cautioned that PAEs could employ injunctive relief "as a
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees."10 4 In such cases, he argued
that "legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate [PAEs] for
the infringement and [that] an injunction may not serve the public
interest."105
The majority opinion took no position on whether injunctive
relief should or should not issue to PAEs in this case and did not
indicate whether PAEs normally qualify for such relief.106 In dicta,
the Court merely noted that a patent holder's willingness to license its
patents and "its lack of commercial activity in practicing patents" do
not, by themselves, establish that the holder would not suffer
irreparable harm or that injunctive relief should be denied.07 Hence,
the Court's decision gave district courts little guidance about which
entities would generally qualify for injunctive relief.108 The decision
left to the district courts the determination of whether and when
PAEs would qualify for injunctive relief based on the four-factor
test. 109
98. Id. at 391.
99. See CARRIER, supra note 9, at 236-38.
100. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394-95 (Roberts, J., concurring); id. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
101. Id. at 395 (Roberts, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 396.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 396-97.
106. Id. at 394.
107. Id. at 393.
108. See CARRIER, supra note 9, at 244.
109. Id.
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D. Resulting Inconsistency in the District Courts
The eBay Court failed to offer sufficient guidance on the
application of its multi-factor test for granting permanent injunctions
in patent infringement cases.110 The ambiguity of the majority opinion
and the divergent concurring opinions created significant uncertainty
about the circumstances under which courts should deny permanent
injunctions in patent infringement cases.' This has led to a
pronounced split in the federal district courts regarding whether and
under what circumstances PAEs deserve injunctive relief.112 To make
matters worse, the Federal Circuit has since taken a mostly passive
approach by largely deferring to lower-court interpretations of the
eBay test.113 As a result, courts have applied the eBay standard
inconsistently in a number of factually similar cases.114
As of March 31, 2010, of the seventy-six reported federal patent
infringement cases since eBay, courts have denied permanent
injunctions in twenty-one cases and granted permanent injunctions in
fifty-five cases.115 Unfortunately, courts have not applied a consistent
rule in these cases, but some trends have emerged.116  The
inconsistency at the district court level involved three issues: (1)
whether nonpracticing entities should receive injunctive relief; (2)
whether the irreparable-harm prong focuses exclusively on harm to
the patentee; and (3) whether the adversaries at trial must also be
competitors in the market before the court will grant an injunction.117
First, district courts have placed inconsistent emphasis on the
patentee's status as a practicing or nonpracticing entity.118  For
example, on remand from the Supreme Court, the district court in
eBay denied injunctive relief to MercExchange, LLC. 119 The court
stated, "MercExchange's consistent practice of licensing, rather than
developing, its patents ... is one factor that [the] court must consider
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, at 2-49. But cf. Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp.,
569 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
consider the eBay factors when denying a permanent injunction).
113. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 43, at 2-49.
114. See, e.g., Andrei lancu & W. Joss Nichols, Balancing the Four Factors in Permanent
Injunction Decisions: A Review of Post-eBay Case Law, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 395,
404 (2007) (noting that most courts since the eBay decision continued to grant permanent
injunctions, but denied such relief for patent trolls).
115. FTC, supra note 16, 272-78.
116. See supra Part I.D.
117. FTC, supra note 16, 262-68.
118. Id.
119. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 556 (E.D. Va. 2007).
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in weighing the equities."120 Thus, despite the Supreme Court's
cautioning against inflexible rules, certain district courts have
maintained the position that a patentee's status as a PAE or a
practicing entity strongly affects whether they will receive injunctive
relief. 121
Similarly, the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court's denial
of injunctive relief in Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp. primarily
because the patentee was a PAE. 12 2 The court concluded that denial of
the injunction would neither adversely affect the patentee's ability to
license its technology nor adversely affect its reputation or market
share because Paice was not a manufacturer.12 3
But some district courts have granted injunctive relief even
though the patentee was a PAE. For instance, in Commonwealth
Scientific & Industrial Research Organisations v. Buffalo Technology
Inc.,124 the court found that the plaintiff had lost irrevocable research
opportunities and suffered reputational damage despite not
commercializing its inventions in the marketplace.125 Consequently, it
is unclear whether a party's status as a PAE precludes it from
injunctive relief.126
Second, the courts lack consistency when deciding whether to
look at only patentee harm in assessing the irreparable-harm and
adequate-remedies factors of the four-factor test, or whether to
consider harm to both the patentee and the alleged infringer. In many
cases, courts have emphasized harm only to the patentee in the
"balance of hardships" analysis.127 Some district courts decline to
consider the harm to the defendant, relying on Federal Circuit
precedent whereby a defendant "who elects to build a business on a
product found to infringe cannot be heard to complain if an injunction
against continuing infringement destroys the business so elected."128
However, many courts will in fact consider harm to the alleged
infringer, often looking at: (1) the infringing company's size; (2) the
effect of an injunction on the infringer's total sales; and (3) other
harmful effects of the injunction on the defendant.129 Therefore, the
120. Id. at 570.
121. See id. at 587-88.
122. 504 F.3d 1293, 1302, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
123. Id. at 1303.
124. 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
125. Id. at 604.
126. See id.
127. FTC, supra note 16, at 268-70.
128. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1003 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
129. FTC, supra note 16, at 260.
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law regarding whether to consider harm to the alleged infringer, or
only to the patentee, is unsettled.130
Third, in analyzing the irreparable-harm and
adequate-remedies prongs, courts have also been inconsistent in
granting permanent injunctions when patentees and infringers
compete with each other in a market.131 For example, in Verizon
Services Corp. v. Vonage Holding Corp., the Federal Circuit held that
evidence of competition that led to price erosion and Verizon's "lost
opportunities to sell other services to the lost customers" proved
irreparable harm.132 Indeed, some scholars have noted that, after
eBay, this "market competition" issue has become an unofficial
requirement for the issuance of injunctive relief in patent cases.133
However, some courts have imposed a higher evidentiary standard
and have declined to find the irreparable-harm and adequate-remedy
prongs satisfied based merely on a general pleading of competition.134
In Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., a district court denied an injunction
because, even though the parties were in "direct and head-to-head
competition," the patentee failed to provide specific data about lost
market share, profits, and goodwill. 135 In short, the courts have not
articulated a consistent rule regarding the "market competition"
issue.136
The inconsistencies in the district courts raise three questions
that are analyzed in this Note: (1) whether there is any harm caused
by the district courts' inconsistent application of the eBay standard;
(2) what factors should guide the district courts in their grant or
denial of equitable relief; and (3) to whom should the responsibility of
crafting these decisional factors fall?
130. See id.
131. Bernard H. Chao, After eBay Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for
Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 543, 549-52 (2008).
132. 503 F.3d 1295, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
133. Benjamin H. Diessel, Note, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging Market
Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 305, 309 (2007).
134. See, e.g., Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (D. Del. 2007)
(denying injunction because patentee only made general arguments about economic harm, but





II. INCORPORATING PATENT HOLDUP INTO THE INJUNCTIVE-RELIEF
DEBATE
From an antitrust perspective, the Supreme Court's failure to
provide clear guidance in eBay was deficient.137 At best, the district
courts' inconsistent approaches to injunctive relief has allowed the
phenomenon of patent holdup to continue, resulting in static and
dynamic efficiency losses.138 At worst, the district courts' inconsistent
approaches may have increased the frequency of patent holdup by
injecting additional uncertainty into the patent-licensing negotiation
process.139 Recent case studies from the high-tech sector illustrate the
growing prevalence of holdup in the technology industry and call into
question the adequacy of private (as opposed to government)
solutions.140 The case studies also highlight the need for urgent
corrective action.141 The courts, Congress, and administrative
agencies have failed to address patent holdup due to a lack of
institutional expertise, a lack of will, and a lack of authority,
respectively.142 But sunlight is the best disinfectant,143 and perhaps
by illuminating the causes of the government's inaction, a solution to
patent holdup will emerge.144
A. eBay's Failure to Address Patent Holdup
The main problem with the Supreme Court's eBay decision is
that it did not define the proper scope of patent remedies.145
Specifically, the Court provided unclear standards in determining
which types of entities qualify for injunctive relief and what facts
must be present for such relief to be warranted.146 In doing so, the
Court failed to incorporate patent holdup concerns into a guiding
standard for injunctive relief.'4 7
A large segment of patent law scholars support Justice
Kennedy's position in eBay-that PAEs do not deserve injunctive
137. See infra Part II.A.
138. See infra Part II.A.
139. See infra Part II.C.
140. See infra Part I1.B, II.D.
141. See infra Part II.B, II.D.
142. See infra Part II.E.
143. See LouIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
144. See infra Part II.E.
145. See CARRIER, supra note 9, at 236-38.
146. Id. at 244.
147. See id. at 244-45.
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relief.148 For example, Bernard Chao has noted that injunctions only
help PAEs increase the settlement value of their patents, and thus
any harm to PAEs from infringement "can be adequately addressed
through monetary damages."149
By not categorically denying equitable relief to PAEs in patent
disputes, the eBay Court left intact the primary mechanism by which
PAEs hold up downstream manufacturers: the threat of an
injunction.150 Such threats may or may not be credible, since neither
patentees nor licensees can be sure when an injunction will be
granted.15 1 But given manufacturers' unwillingness to bet the farm by
litigating a patent dispute to final judgment, uncertainty in licensing
and settlement negotiations can cause companies to err on the side of
caution and "buy off' PAEs.152 Thus, in failing to eliminate injunctive
relief for PAEs, the Supreme Court failed to mitigate patent holdup, a
phenomenon that many scholars agree is threatening the very
purposes of patent and antitrust law.153
B. Holdup: Is It a Problem?
As with any unsettled area of the law, there is a vibrant debate
about whether the concerns of patent holdup should inform post-eBay
injunction doctrine.154 Critics raise two lines of attack.155
First, holdup skeptics argue that withholding injunctive relief
from PAEs will cause manufacturers to increasingly infringe patents
rather than licensing a PAE's technology.156 As the FTC notes, this
argument makes two fatal assumptions: (1) that the manufacturer has
preinfringement notice of the patent and a clear idea of the boundaries
of the patent when it is designing its product; and (2) that a
manufacturer, upon discovery of potential patent infringement, can
quickly redesign its product, eliminating the use of the infringed
148. See, e.g., Chao, supra note 131, at 557.
149. Id.
150. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 1179.
151. See Kelley, supra note 17 (discussing how uncertainty allowed a lower settlement
than previously expected); Cotter, supra note 19, at 1171.
152. See Kelley, supra note 17 (discussing the RIM-NTP example).
153. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 1157.
154. Many scholars caution against injunctive relief for PAEs. See id. at 1207; Lemley &
Shapiro, supra note 69, at 2173; Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability
Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 798-99 (2007). Other scholars favor injunctive
relief for PAEs. See Vincenzo Deniocolo et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in
High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & EcON. 571, 571
(2008); Golden, supra note 84, at 2148-49; Sidak, supra note 84, at 747.
155. See FTC, supra note 16, at 226-27; see also Sidak, supra note 84, at 736-43.
156. See FTC, supra note 16, at 226.
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technology to avoid paying reasonable royalties.157  The first
assumption is incorrect, according to the FTC, because, in the
high-tech industry, software patents suffer from an ambiguity in
scope, and manufacturers have no clear preinfringement notice about
whether they are infringing.158  Second, as discussed above,
manufacturers face problems of sunk costs and high switching costs,
which means it is costly and inefficient to create a noninfringing
product.159
Critics also argue that if courts incorporate holdup analysis
into the injunctive-relief doctrine, it would decrease the royalties
earned by inventors, thereby reducing the incentive to innovate and
harming consumers.160 As noted by the FTC, this argument is also
unconvincing. 161 In a holdup scenario, PAEs are able to extract more
compensation than they would have otherwise in the competitive
marketplace.162 But a patentee cannot assume this windfall when
developing technology ex ante and filing for a patent because a
patentee cannot anticipate whether follow-on innovators will use its
technology.163 Thus, since patentees cannot know whether they will
have the chance to earn a windfall via patent holdup, the availability
of injunctive relief does not provide ex ante incentives to innovate.164
PAEs also typically do not innovate, since innovation requires
additional development beyond obtaining a patent.165 PAEs simply
amass patent portfolios and prepare for litigation to earn
supracompetitive royalties.166 Thus, patent holdup is a legitimate
concern to incorporate into the post-eBay injunctive relief doctrine.167
C. How Ambiguous Standards Exacerbate Patent Holdup
By promulgating a vague standard for granting injunctive
relief in cases of patent infringement, the Supreme Court may have
unwittingly increased the prevalence of holdup in a post-eBay world.
This argument relies on two premises: (1) uncertainty regarding the




160. See Golden, supra note 84, at 2111; Sidak, supra note 84, at 734-36.
161. See FTC, supra note 16, at 226.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 226-27.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 227.
166. See id. at 225-27.
167. Id. at 235.
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(2) given the problem of patent notice, some companies misjudge the
scope of existing patent claims, resulting in riskier patent filings and
more holdups.
First, the uncertainty and inconsistency eBay created at the
district court level increases the frequency of patent holdup. When
follow-on inventors and downstream users face risk and uncertainty
about the platform technology they use, such inventors cannot be sure
if an injunctive threat is legitimate. Since eBay, PAEs have thrived in
this uncertain environment because they can credibly threaten
injunctions against a potential infringer. The potential infringer
cannot rely on precedent suggesting that the PAE will be denied
injunctive relief.16 8 Thus, companies must run the risk of courts
finding in favor of PAEs shutting down their business, which
increases uncertainty and costs and discourages innovation. Since the
mere threat of a permanent injunction deters innovation, the
uncertainty surrounding whether a PAE will qualify for such relief
exacerbates the problem of patent holdup.
Second, eBay's vague standards complicate business planning,
leading to additional infringement.1 6 9 Aggressive business planners
may view the ambiguity as a business opportunity and expand their
manufacturing in a way that may run up against questionable patent
boundaries.170 Alternatively, firms may simply find it more difficult to
investigate and determine whether their manufactured product
exceeds the boundaries of a patentee's claims.171 Aggressive business
planners might pursue a business model that exposes them to ambush
by PAEs.172 Consequently, eBay exacerbates the frequency of patent
holdup.
D. Case Studies in the High-Tech Sector and the Failure of Private
Ordering
Two recent case studies show how spurious litigation can be
particularly debilitating in the high-tech industry, where an
unregulated approach to standard-setting organizations (SSOs) has
168. Note that holdup would be even more prevalent if the Supreme Court adopted the
Federal Circuit's general presumption in favor of injunctions, whether the patentee is a PAE or
not. But in rejecting the Federal Circuit's presumption, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
such a universal standard ignores traditional principles of equity. In addition, the courts have
generally been hesitant to grant injunctive relief to nonpracticing and noncompeting entities,
such as PAEs. See supra Part I.C.






made the phenomenon of patent holdup increasingly prevalent.17 3
SSOs attempt to avoid the holdup problem by requiring participants
in a standard-setting process to commit to license foundational
patents on "Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory" (RAND) terms.17 4
Although RAND commitments are a possible solution to the holdup
problem, two recent examples from the high-tech industry illustrate
the shortcomings of the SSO approach.175
In FTC v. Rambus, Inc., the FTC asserted that Rambus
violated antitrust laws by abusing its dominant position in the market
for DRAM chips.176 Specifically, the FTC claimed that Rambus
engaged in "patent ambush," a particularly egregious form of patent
holdup, by intentionally concealing its patents and patent
applications, which were essential to an ongoing industry-wide DRAM
standard-setting process.177  The FTC accused Rambus of
subsequently charging downstream chip manufacturers exorbitant
royalties on its patents rather than licensing its technology on RAND
terms.178  The D.C. Circuit held that Rambus had not violated
antitrust laws.17 9 Nevertheless, in a settlement agreement, the FTC
convinced Rambus to reduce the amount licensees paid. 180
In a second example, Qualcomm acquired monopoly power in
the telecommunications industry after convincing a standard-setting
organization for the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System to
adopt a standard that incorporates its patents by promising to license
its patents on RAND terms.181 Broadcom, a chipset manufacturer,
alleged that Qualcomm violated antitrust laws by charging more than
a RAND fee to licensees.18 2 In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., the
Third Circuit held that "a patent holder's intentionally false promise
to license essential proprietary technology on [RAND] terms . . . is
actionable anticompetitive conduct."183 Broadcom illustrates a second
recent example in which the SSO system has failed.184
173. See the discussion herein of Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008) and
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007).
174. Luke M. Froeb et a]., Patent Hold Up and Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule
Could Retard Innovation 3 (Vanderbilt Law and Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11-3, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1340722.
175. See supra Part II.D.
176. See Rambus, 522 F.3d at 459.
177. Froeb et al., supra note 174, at 2.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2 n.2.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 2 n.3
182. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 304 (3d Cir. 2007).
183. Id. at 314.
184. Id.
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Those who disfavor government solutions might argue that the
private sector can solve patent holdup.185 However, private ordering
fails because of the inherent difference between "intellectual property"
and other types of property.186 Patents differ from real property in
that:
[Tihe boundaries of a plot of land and the validity of a title usually can be verified at
little cost and with little uncertainty. In contrast, the validity of a patent may be
challenged and firms often have difficulty determining whether a technology infringes
the boundaries of a patent's claims.1
8 7
The inherent uncertainty of patent validity affects the
incentives of self-interested actors in the marketplace.1 8 Instead of
licensing patents ex ante, "[slome firms 'stumble' and make
unauthorized use of patented technology."'8 9  Other firms might
inadequately investigate issued patents only to later find out that they
are infringing.90 In essence, private agreements like SSOs will still
lead to holdup and patent infringement suits because patents are
rarely defined clearly.191
Furthermore, once parties agree to enter an SSO, they may
later discover that they are indeed in violation of some asserted
patent, as seen in the cases above.192 In these situations, the patentee
who promised to license on RAND terms has an incentive to cheat and
demand supracompetitive royalties under the threat of an
injunction.193 Clearly, private actors can exploit the SSO process, and
private solutions can fail.194 While those in favor of private ordering
might argue that companies can avoid patent holdup through private
agreements, Rambus and Broadcom illustrate that private ordering is
not the panacea for patent holdup.195 And where markets fail, there
may be a need for governmental intervention.196
185. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein et al., The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up
Replacing Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1 (2012).






192. See supra notes 172-95 and accompanying text.
193. See supra Part II.
194. Supra Part II..
195. See supra Part II.D.
196. See infra Part II.E.
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E. A Problem of Governmental Expertise, Will, and Authority
The case studies above highlight the need for urgent corrective
action.197 This Note argues that three entities-the courts, Congress,
and administrative agencies-have thus far failed to address patent
holdup due to a lack of institutional expertise, a lack of will, and a lack
of authority, respectively.1 98 But, in analyzing the causes of the
government's inaction, a solution for combatting patent holdup
emerges.199
As demonstrated by post-eBay cases, the courts, thus far, have
failed to address patent holdup in their injunctive-relief doctrines.2 00
Perhaps one reason why the district courts have promulgated such
vague standards for injunctive relief is because they are not equipped
with the appropriate expertise.201 In Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., Justice White admitted, "We are, on
the whole, a body of generalists."202 As seen in Paice, courts are often
called upon to assess economic arguments in deciding the merits of
injunctive relief, such as market definition disputes, to determine
whether or not the patentee and alleged infringer are competitors.203
But the courts primarily rely on amicus briefs from interested
outsiders and are themselves inexpert at assessing the economic
arguments.204 This has produced inconsistency in that some courts
grant injunctive relief to PAEs, and some do not.2 05 Also, whereas
some courts grant injunctive relief to competitors, others do not.2 06
Ironically, since the Federal Circuit has primarily affirmed the
lower courts' economically inconsistent holdings, the court is
undermining its own legitimacy.207 Indeed, Congress granted the
Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under the
patent laws specifically because the Federal Circuit was considered to
197. See supra Part II.D.
198. See infra Part II.E.
199. See infra Part III.
200. See CARRIER, supra note 9, at 236-38.
201. Id. at 238.
202. 458 U.S. 50, 118 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
203. See CARRIER, supra note 9, at 236; see also Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504
F.3d 1293, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
204. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts' Friends Can
Teach Us About the Patent System, I U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 395 (2011).
205. FTC, supra note 16, at 272-78 (listing cases in which some courts grant injunctive
relief and others do not).
206. See Chao, supra note 131.
207. George C. Beighley, Jr., The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Has it
Fulfilled Congressional Expectations?, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 671, 673
(2011).
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have expertise in the field and because Congress wanted uniformity in
the law.2 0 8  Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has affirmed
inconsistent applications of the eBay standard.209 What is required is
guidance from elsewhere.210
One natural alternative is to look to Congress for guidance.
Indeed, Congress has the power to promulgate the remedial scheme in
the patent code.211 In fact, in an ideal world, Congress would be the
best vehicle to promulgate laws about the availability of injunctive
relief because courts generally view their role in statutory
interpretation as giving effect to the will of Congress.212
Unfortunately, although the best solution to patent holdup may be
legislative reform, Congress recently passed on an opportunity to
resolve the issue.213
On September 15, 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, which limited the ability of PAEs to join
unrelated parties to a suit,2 1 4 but such actions ultimately do not
address injunctive relief in patent disputes.215 This failure to address
injunctive relief is unfortunate, especially considering how
infrequently Congress enacts major patent law reform.216  Given
Congress's recent passage of major patent legislation and failure to
address patent holdup, it is unlikely that Congress will take up the
issue again in the near future.217
The next-best-situated government entity to address the issue
of patent holdup may be an independent administrative agency, such
as the FTC or the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).
Independent regulatory agencies are generally composed of
nonpolitical bureaucrats that exercise expert judgment in carrying out
congressional policy. 2 18  "Regulation by means of administration
208. Id.
209. See Chao, supra note 131.
210. See supra Part I.
211. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).
212. Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 353-54 (2005) (describing
the widely held belief that in interpreting statutes the fundamental objective of courts is to act as
faithful agents of Congress).
213. See supra Part I.
214. Gorenstein, supra note 34 (describing the Act's joinder restrictions, but noting that
it is so far unclear how courts will interpret this provision).
215. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
216. The last major patent legislation prior to the America Invents Act of 2011 was the
Patent Act of 1952. See Bryson Act, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952).
217. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 125 Stat. 284 (failing to address patent
holdup).
218. See generally Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust
Needs a New Deal, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1263-64 (2011).
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agencies offer[s] the advantages of expertise and flexibility and
promise[s] a rational, scientific method of controlling business
activity."219
The advantage to the administrative approach is that agencies
such as the FTC can better collect and analyze technical economic
evidence that is required to craft efficient guidelines for the
injunctive-relief doctrine.220 The FTC has frequent exposure to patent
issues and a broad perspective of what economic factors are material
in resolving disputes regarding injunctive relief.2 2 1 Of course, the PTO
has even more frequent exposure to patent issues, but it seems
unlikely that the government agency responsible for granting patents
would promulgate guidelines for enjoining the exercise of patent
rights, especially given the PTO's alternative processes for patent
reexamination.222
Agencies such as the FTC are also able to investigate, while the
district courts are not; agencies are able to gather data, conduct
studies, and, in the case of the FTC, subpoena companies.223 These
agencies are able to employ hundreds of economists, who would be
able to draw on greater relevant knowledge and experience when
fashioning rules that would promote efficient outcomes in the realm of
patent injunctions.224  Agencies can also achieve regulation by
rulemaking without the formal Article III requirements of a case or
controversy, making the agencies nimbler than courts in promulgating
rules and providing a forum for citizen participation.22 5
The FTC has been involved in recent administrative efforts to
reform patent law. On March 7, 2011, the FTC released a report that
argued that spurious injunction threats are hamstringing the
high-tech industry.226  The report made several specific
recommendations for reforming patent remedies, including a
recommendation that courts consider the public's interest in avoiding
219. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 116 (2008).
220. See, e.g., Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and
Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 445 (2006).
221. See FTC, supra note 16, at 2, 32.
222. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 2, 301 (2006).
223. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 46 (2006) (outlining the investigative and reporting
capabilities of the FTC).
224. Haw, supra note 218, at 1263-64.
225. Id. at 1267, 1285. This Note proposes a novel approach to patent law in one sense:
since the patent code is viewed by many as a common-law-enabling statute, it is typically the
courts that are the principal architects of patent law doctrine. See CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF
PATENTS 5 (2d ed. 2011). However, as this Note argues, courts have failed to address patent
holdup due to a lack of will and institutional expertise. See supra Part II.
226. See FTC, supra note 16, at 26.
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patent holdup.227 The FTC's report stopped short of offering any rules
to guide the courts, perhaps acknowledging the limits of its own
power.228 Although the FTC may be the best-equipped government
entity to provide rules of thumb to the courts, the agency currently
lacks explicit congressional authority to engage in substantive
rulemaking.229 This situation should change.230
III. AN ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTION: EMPOWER THE FTC WITH
SUBSTANTIVE RULEMAKING AUTHORITY OVER EQUITABLE PATENT
REMEDIES
This Note proposes that Congress give the FTC substantive
rulemaking authority over injunctive relief in patent cases in order to
combat the phenomenon of patent holdup.231 Courts have failed to
embrace clear guiding principles with respect to injunctive relief and
lack the expertise to formulate consistent doctrine involving
complicated economic analysis.232 This observation strengthens the
case for empowering the FTC with substantive rulemaking authority.
Congress should take the task of weighing complicated economic
arguments out of the hands of generalist courts and place it in the
hands of institutions designed to deal with technical matters in a
thorough and transparent manner.
A. Outlining the FTC's New Rulemaking Authority
The US government has an elaborate administrative apparatus
for the issuing of patents, but no regulatory body is tasked with the
regulation of patents thereafter.233 Congress should change the FTC's
statutory authority to confer the agency with substantive rulemaking
power over interpretations of patent and antitrust norms.234
227. See id.
228. See id. at 15 (declining to offer rules to guide courts).
229. See infra Part III.A.
230. See infra Part III.A.
231. Other scholars have raised the possibility of expanding the FTC's power to engage
in substantive rulemaking in other contexts. See Haw, supra note 218, at 1284-85 (arguing that
Congress should grant the FTC substantive rulemaking authority to make definitive
interpretations of the Sherman Antitrust Act); see also Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and
Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1212 (2008).
232. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 118 (1982) (White,
J., dissenting) ("We are, on the whole, a body of generalists.").
233. See supra Part III.A.
234. Scanning other available agencies, the FTC is a superior option to the DOJ since the
former is more insulated from political pressure. Additionally, the PTO is an inferior option,
because the very agency that grants patents in the first place (often too many, in the eyes of
scholars) cannot be expected to advocate necessary reform that would ultimately reduce the
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Of course, the FTC Act theoretically gave the agency the power
to make substantive antitrust rules.2 35 However, "during the Taft and
Wilson administrations, the character of the proposed" and enacted
FTC Act changed from "administrative agency to law-enforcement
agency."2 3 6 It is unclear whether the "institutional status quo" would
thwart any effort by the FTC to promulgate substantive rules absent
modern, explicit congressional approval.237
A recent example involving the pharmaceutical industry
illustrates the FTC's current limitations given its uncertain
rulemaking authority.238  The FTC attempted to establish
industry-wide norms to guide lawsuits between manufacturers of
branded drugs and their generic counterparts.239 Despite following
procedures that roughly tracked the Administrative Procedure Act's
(APA) requirements for agency rulemaking (including an exhaustive
study, public hearings, public comment, and a rule-like holding), the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the FTC's decision.240 The court deemed the
FTC's new rule undeserving of deference to the agency's expertise on
patent and settlements and instead followed a prior decision from the
Eleventh Circuit.241 This development denied the FTC the ability to
use its technocratic expertise to formulate broadly applicable
public-policy prescriptions.2 4 2
Congress should make explicit the FTC's power to promulgate
substantive rules.2 4 3 The FTC is a natural home for this type of
rulemaking authority for several reasons. First, the agency has
patent expertise. The FTC has already played an important role in
formulating policy recommendations concerning injunctive relief in
patent disputes.244 On March 7, 2011, the FTC released a report
entitled "The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and
Remedies with Competition."245  The report represents the
culmination of hearings, public comments, and panel discussions
aimed at developing improvements to policies affecting patent notice
agency's revenues. Thus, interpretive power should go to the more technocratic, independent
agency, the FTC. See supra Part III.A.
235. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a) (2006).
236. Crane, supra note 231, at 1198.
237. Id. at 1199.
238. Id. at 1200.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1200-01.
241. Id. at 1201.
242. Id. at 1202.
243. See generally FTC, supra note 16.
244. See id.; see also FTC, supra note 30.
245. FTC, supra note 16.
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and remedies for patent infringement.2 46 The report makes several
specific recommendations for changing the patent notification and
remedy process.247 It argues that courts should "clearly define[]
remedies that take into account the type of infringement that is
alleged and the contributions made by the alleged infringer to
innovation and competition."248
Also, extending the FTC's power to include substantive
rulemaking authority would be consistent with the agency's enabling
act.2 4 9 Congress enacted the FTC Act in 1914, creating the FTC and
giving it authority to police "[u]nfair methods of competition."25 0
Patent holdup certainly falls within the scope of this legislative
authority because the threat of injunctions is used to extract
supracompetitive royalties.251
Most importantly, the FTC's expertise in the areas of antitrust
and patent law offers the best hope of resolving the problem of patent
holdup. The agency can employ its expert perspective in , the
notice-and-comment rulemaking process to formulate efficient policy
solutions that guide the courts about what circumstances should exist
before those courts grant injunctive relief in patent disputes.252 This
approach would gather many diverse perspectives and is transparent
in process.253 Naturally, the agency's rules would be subject to judicial
review.254
246. Id.
247. The FTC's recommendations include: (1) "Courts should not presume irreparable
harm based on a finding of infringement or the patentee's use of the patent. Conversely, courts
should recognize that infringement can irreparably harm the ability of patentees that primarily
engage in technology transfer through licensing to compete in a technology market"; (2) "Courts
should consider the hardship of an infringer facing hold-up under this prong. Courts should
reject the statement that an infringer 'cannot be heard to complain if an injunction against
continuing infringement destroys the business' except in those instances where an infringer
'elects' to infringe by copying a patented invention with knowledge of the patent"; and (3) "When
warranted by the facts, courts should consider the public's interest in avoiding patent hold-up,
which can increase costs and deter innovation." FTC, supra note 16, at 27-28.
248. Elizabeth C. Brandon, FTC Report Recommends Changes to U.S. Patent System to
Promote Competition and Innovation, VINSON & ELKINS LLP, http://www.velaw.com/resources/
FTCReportRecommendsChangesUSPatentSystemPromoteCompetitionlnnovation.aspx (last
visited Aug. 29, 2012).
249. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006).
250. Id. § 45.
251. Deborah P. Majoras, Chairman, FTC, Remarks Prepared for Standardization and
the Law: Developing the Golden Mean for Global Trade (Sept. 23, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf).
252. See CARRIER, supra note 9, at 236.
253. See 15 U.S.C. § 45.
254. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2006).
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B. What the FTC Should Consider in Promulgating Rules
Endowed with norm-creating authority over patent injunction
rules, the FTC should promulgate rules outlining what circumstances
should exist before a patentee receives full injunctive relief.2 55 This
Note recommends that the FTC should consider some of the following
factors in fashioning its rules:
* The extent to which there is clear evidence that the patentee is
a PAE. Due to the antitrust considerations discussed above,
the courts should deny PAEs injunctive relief in all but the
most exceptional circumstances.25 6 The FTC might recommend
that if there is clear and convincing evidence that the patentee
is a PAE that obtains patents primarily to garner license fees
and not to practice the invention, the courts should deny
injunctive relief.
* The extent to which the patented technology is a minor
component that an inventor could have easily designed around
ex ante as part of a complex product.257  In such cases,
injunctive relief might be inappropriate because the PAE is
likely employing the threat of an injunction as undue leverage
in negotiations, thereby increasing patent holdup.258
* The extent to which the patentee and alleged infringer are
competitors in the market affected by the patent.259 A patentee
should not be allowed to simply assert that the defendant and
it are competitors.260 Rather, a patentee should have to provide
evidence, such as lost market share, lost customers, and price
255. Although this Note discusses incorporating holdup concerns into patent injunction
doctrine, it does not recommend that patent holdup become an affirmative defense to patent
infringement suits. Patent infringement should be punished with reasonable royalties in all
cases and injunctive relief in some.
256. Compare Chao, supra note 131, at 557 ("An injunction only helps a non-practicing
entity by increasing the settlement value of its patent . . . . By definition, this harm can be
adequately addressed through monetary damages."), with David B. Conrad, Note, Mining the
Patent Thicket: The Supreme Court's Rejection of the Automatic Injunction Rule in eBay v.
MercExchange, 26 REv. LITIG. 119, 150 n.151 (2007) ("[T]here may be a situation in which a
nonmanufacturing, non-competing patent owner would prefer the injunction to future royalties,
perhaps because other potential licensees demand exclusivity. In such cases, the permanent
injunction would serve a valid purpose."). The only valid purpose for granting PAEs injunctive
relief is to preserve exclusivity for other potential licensees.
257. See FTC, supra note 16, at 227.
258. Id. at 217.
259. See CARRIER, supra note 9, at 236-38.
260. See id.
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erosion.261  Where the infringement affects the patentee's
ability to compete in a product or technology market, there are
good reasons to grant injunctive relief.26 2
This Note recommends that the FTC consider these factors in
formulating guidance for the district courts in the application of the
new injunctive-relief doctrine. Given the unique nature of patent
holdup as an issue at the crossroads of antitrust and patent law, the
FTC would be wise to draw lessons from both fields.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Silicon Valley, the patent wars continue apace, potentially
undermining the United States' ability to innovate and its
competitiveness in the global marketplace. The rise of PAEs seeking
injunctive relief has only exacerbated the problem. The Supreme
Court had an opportunity in eBay to clarify the law of equitable relief
in patent disputes, but it failed to act. Confusion and inconsistency at
the district court level demonstrate that clearer rules are needed. In
the absence of such rules, innovators will continue to fall victim to
patent holdup, which deters competition and innovation. The state of
patent litigation today is a call to arms to transfer decision-making
power out of the hands of the inexpert district courts and into the
hands of a specialized agency. The FTC has unique capabilities of
soliciting and understanding technical information to formulate new,
effective patent law. Thus, Congress should give the FTC the power to
promulgate rules for patent disputes that help combat the problem of
patent holdup.
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